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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates a variety of scenarios in 
which control signals utilized in high-voltage DC 
(HVDC) modulation are subjected to oscillatory error 
due to GPS spoofing of phasor measurement unit 
(PMU) time synchronization. The result of this 
spoofing is the presence of forced oscillations in a 
system through HVDC modulation due to cyclic 
erroneous measurements. These scenarios are tested in 
the Kundur two-area system with a supplementary 
HVDC line which utilizes various supplementary 
controllers for modulation. The simulation results are 
examined for system transient behavior as well as for 
the observable small-signal effects of the GPS spoofed 
control signals across the system. It is found that the 
harmonics of the spoofed control signal frequencies 
can interact with the inter-area modes of the system, 
resulting in resonant oscillations and the severity of 
the oscillations is dependent upon the magnitude of the 
time-error and the damping levels of the system modes.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Most of the long-distance power transfer that 
occurs across the grid occurs over high-voltage AC 
(HVAC) transmission lines. The remaining power 
transmission infrastructure consists of HVDC 
transmission lines which may be utilized for purposes 
ranging from power transfer between two 
unsynchronized systems, to improving stability across 
a region due to its ability to modulate power flow 
between its endpoints. This modulation of the HVDC 
flow is typically achieved using a supplementary 
controller, which allows the HVDC link to provide 
improvements to damping of AC system oscillations, 
transient stability, and voltage support [1]. While early 
implementations of HVDC modulation can be found 
within the western interconnection as early as the 
1970’s [2], the invention of phasor measurement units 
(PMUs) in the following decade could permit the usage 
of phase angle difference across remote HVDC 
terminals as a feasible control input for HVDC 
modulation. Such HVDC modulation methods have 
been proposed such as in [3].  Recently there has been 
a major effort to develop and implement phase angle 
difference based HVDC control modulation for the 
Pacific DC Intertie (PDCI) in [4] for small-signal 
stability benefits. 
As new technologies proliferate throughout the 
industry and become more integrated into new control 
methods, the topics of grid security and reliability 
increasingly include questions about cybersecurity and 
reliability of the information upon which control 
actions are taken. The wide adoption of PMUs 
throughout the grid provides tremendous 
improvements in system visibility and facilitates 
operations and control methods which were impossible 
prior to their creation. A key piece of data which 
PMUs depend upon to serve their purpose, namely 
GPS time synchronization data, is something that has 
the potential to be compromised and can in turn cause 
deleterious effects. Of the possible types of possible 
GPS spoofing that may occur, spoofing that produces 
an oscillatory error is of particular interest in the 
context of oscillatory stability due to its potential for 
resonant interaction with system modes. The focus of 
this paper is the examination of the possible effects of 
GPS spoofing on oscillation monitoring and oscillation 
damping in a simulated case containing an HVDC line 
utilizing PMU acquired voltage angle measurements as 
control input.  
 
2. GPS Spoofing Test Signals 
 
Devices that utilize a GPS signal are susceptible to 
interference from jamming or spoofing attacks which 
may range in their complexity from simple to 
sophisticated. As the focus of this paper is the effect of 
spoofing, a fundamental description is detailed in [5] of 
how such interference can affect the time 
synchronization of a GPS device. From here, we 
proceed on the assumption that an attempt at spoofing 
a GPS signal used by a PMU has occurred successfully 
and is tailored to impact the target device on relevant 
time scales. In the context of power system stability 
our focus is on inter-area oscillations, therefore the 
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type of spoofing investigated here involve cyclic 
oscillatory signals. 
As inter-area modes are known to typically be well 
below 1 Hz [2], the frequencies chosen for the test 
spoofed signals were 0.25 Hz, 0.33 Hz, and 0.50 Hz. 
An appropriate amplitude for the spoofed signals, 
meaning the amount of phase shift implied by the 
oscillatory spoofed signal, was determined using the 
following assumptions and information: 
• Signal delay from a GPS satellite at an 
altitude of 20,000 km (directly overhead) is 
approximately 66.67 ms. 
• For a 60 Hz grid, a measurement timing 
differential of 1 ms implies a differential in phase angle 
measurement of 21.6°. 
• Time synchronization of the PMU occurs in 1 
second intervals. 
Desiring a spoofed amplitude corresponding to 
<1% deviation from our assumed satellite altitude 
which would also result in a phase angle differential 
much lower than 21.6°, an amplitude change of ±5° 
was chosen, which corresponds to a satellite signal 
delay of 0.2315 ms (or 0.347% altitude error). This 
error magnitude can be chosen to be sufficiently small 
to go undetected by the internal sanity checks within 
the GPS clocks and PMU devices depending on 
specific vendors and the value of ±5° is used in this 
paper for illustration. The magnitude of the resulting 
forced system oscillations will vary mostly linearly 
with the time-error magnitude as shown later in 
Section 4.3.  
Since the timing error can only be introduced in 
one-second intervals during the GPS time 
synchronization stage, the spoofed waveforms in the 
timing error signal are modeled to undergo discrete 
changes every one second in our studies. Accordingly, 
approximations of sinusoidal oscillations by discrete 
waveforms that change every one second are plotted in 
Figure 1 along with the corresponding sinusoidal 
oscillations that they emulate. The simulated signals 
were generated by a user defined model [6] within the 
transient simulation software TSAT [7]. 
 
3. Simulation cases and methods  
 
The simulation case for this paper extends work on 
a two-area system from [3], which has been modified 
from its original specifications in [1] to include a 
HVDC line between the two areas as illustrated in 
Figure 2. The net power transfer from Area 1 to Area 2 
totals 400 MW, divided in half across the HVAC tie 
lines and HVDC line. 
 
 
Figure 1. Waveforms of simulated spoofed signal errors 
and the sinusoidal oscillations they emulate: a) 0.25Hz error, 
b) 0.33 Hz error, c) 0.50 Hz error 
Figure 2. Kundur system with HVDC line 
 
The effects on the system of GPS spoofing with 
various controllers are examined by simulation of a 
three-phase line fault between bus 7 and bus 8 on the 
green line shown in Figure 2. The fault in the transient 
simulation occurs at time t = 1 second and is cleared 
after 0.1 sec. The simulation continues with the line 
remaining out until t = 21 seconds at which point the 
line is restored and the simulation continues up to t = 
40 seconds.  
The input signal for the tested controllers is a phase 
angle difference between bus 7 and bus 9. The set of 
signal modifications made upon either measurement 
includes 0.25 Hz, 0.33 Hz, and 0.50 Hz. The set of 
HVDC modulation controllers tested includes a 
proportional controller as implemented in [8] and 
phase lead compensation of 30°, 60°, 90°, and 120°, as 
proposed in [3]. The suite of scenarios tested is 
comprised of the combination of those two sets where 
the spoofed signal is applied to the bus 7 measurement. 
Additional cases are also examined where spoofing is 
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applied to measurements at both buses 7 and 9, 
referred to as combined cases. A diagram of the GPS 
spoofing affecting the measurement at either bus, as 
well as the controller block diagrams, are given in 
Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Control inputs (left) and block diagrams (right) for 
proportional and lead compensation controllers for HVDC 
modulation. 
 
For phase lead compensation of 30°, 60°, 90°, and 
120° the controller contains N = 1, 2, 3, or 4 stages of 
the phase compensation block with T1 = 0.5513 and 
T2 = 0.1838. The washout block time constant is Tw = 
10 seconds and the output limits are ± 20% of the 
scheduled HVDC flow. Proportional gain kp is set to 
be 1.   
To glean relevant insights of the system’s behavior 
under the test scenarios laid out, an approach was taken 
to run transient simulations for each scenario and 
subsequently apply modal analysis methods to the data 
generated. The transient response of the system was 
simulated using TSAT [6], which provides various 
time series values across the system. Two main 
measures were chosen for examining the transient and 
modal properties of the system: real power-flow across 
the HVDC line and HVAC line between bus 7 and bus 
8, and the voltage phase angle values at each bus in the 
system. The two simulated real power line flows are 
examined to gain some insight into the practical effects 
of each scenario on the system while the angle data 
was used for modal analysis, the results of both are 
detailed in the following section. 
The time series data representing voltage phase 
angle across all buses in the system is used for modal 
analysis in Event Analysis Offline (EAO) software [9]. 
The data for each scenario is reconstructed using 
several modal analysis methods including Prony’s 
method [10], Hankel Total Least Square (HTLS) [3], 
Matrix Pencil (MP) [11], and an eigensystem 
realization algorithm (ERA) [12]. The time series data 
from simulation spans the pre-fault, fault-on, and post-
fault states of the system as well as the time after the 
line is restored. As the state of the system is not 
homogeneous for time windows containing any of 
these transitions the selection of different windows was 
necessary for the analysis methods to yield meaningful 
results. The accuracy of these different windows was 
verified by comparison of FFT of the input data to the 
reconstructions yielded from these methods and will be 
expanded upon in the following section.  
 
4. Simulation Results and Analysis  
 
The frequency and damping of the interarea mode 
of the two-area test system are both affected by the 
different controllers implemented, as well as changes 
in topology like the loss of a line in the simulation 
transient case. To provide context for the results in this 
section the frequency and damping ratio of the 
interarea mode with different controller 
implementations are given in Table 1, reflective of the 
steady state system. Only a select subset of numerical 
results is presented here. 
 
Table 1. Effect of HVDC modulation controllers on inter-
area mode. 
Controller Frequency (Hz) 
Damping 
(%) 
Relative 
Energy (%) 
No control 0.623 1.284 100 
Proportional 0.637 0.532 100 
30° Lead 0.647 1.54 100 
60° Lead 0.664 4.778 100 
90° Lead 0.687 13.635 100 
120° Lead 0.745 19.114 100 
 
4.1. Transient simulation results 
 
Data was collected on the real power flow across 
the HVDC line and HVAC line 7-8 as a starting point 
for assessing the oscillation damping performance of 
the system tested. The plots in Figure 4 show the 
oscillation of real power flow across the HVAC line 7-
8 given different controllers in non-spoofed 
measurement cases. 
The 90° and 120° phase lead compensators were 
found in [3] to provide the best oscillation damping in 
non-spoofed testing, using tie line flow and phase 
angle difference as respective control inputs (as 
confirmed with the bottom plot in Figure 4). As such, 
the effects of those two and the proportional controller 
on HVAC tie line flow oscillations are shown in Figure 
5 for the various spoofed signals considered. The range 
of the real power swings across the HVAC line 7-8 as 
well as HVDC line for the cases shown are given in 
Table 2. 
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Figure 4. Transient inter-area real power flow with non-
spoofed control signals. 
 
Table 2.  Magnitudes of real power flow dynamic range 
during post-fault period (from 1 to 21 seconds in simulation) 
 
It is clear from the data in Table 2 that there is a 
notable impact on real power flow due to the effect of 
GPS spoofing on the HVDC modulation. The values 
presented in the table show the range of the largest 
oscillation during the post-fault period prior to the line 
being restored. Additionally, it is worth noting that the 
case involving 0.50 Hz spoofed error and the 120° lead 
compensator exceeds the range of the HVDC power 
modulation output limits (± 20MW). The observation 
of this swing is likely the result of the interaction of the 
inter-area mode frequency and spoofed frequency 
being very close, in combination with the fact that the 
modulation output signal is a supplementary control 
signal for the HVDC system rather than a hard output 
limit. While the magnitude of the dynamic range of 
HVDC power flow is only slightly beyond the 
expected modulation range, this is an effect of the GPS 
spoofing in which a part of the system is caused to 
operate outside its expected range. 
 
 
Figure 5. Transient inter-area real power flow with 
spoofed control signals. 
 
Testing was done for spoofing of the angle 
measurement at bus 9 as well which yielded results that 
were generally consistent with those presented for the 
spoofing at bus 7. Two combined cases yielded 
significant real power dynamic swings across line 7-8 
for combined scenarios involving a 0.50 Hz error at 
bus 7 and a 0.25 Hz error at bus 9. These two cases, 
which implemented either the 30° or 120° lead 
compensators, resulted in real power swings during the 
post-fault state of 140.29 MW and 100.72 MW 
respectively. Plots of these transient cases are shown in 
Figure 6. 
PMU Meas. Line Proportional 90˚ Lead 120˚ Lead
AC78 (MW) 103.5 37.7 38.2
HVDC (MW) 13.7 26 38.9
AC78 (MW) 112.1 34 48.6
HVDC (MW) 24.3 38.6 38.4
AC78 (MW) 111.2 43.4 59
HVDC (MW) 21.3 33 38.4
AC78 (MW) 147.2 57.5 140.3
HVDC (MW) 28.2 29.2 43.3
Unmodified
0.25 Hz error
0.33 Hz error
0.50 Hz error
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Figure 6. Transient inter-area power flow with spoofed 
control signal of 0.50 Hz at bus 7 and 0.25 Hz at bus 9 
 
4.2. Analysis of system response 
 
Modal analyses were conducted on each case tested 
to identify the characteristics of the system response to 
the spoofed control signals. Any modes identified with 
a relative energy (RE) of 5% or higher were recorded 
in set presented in Table 3. The data presented in the 
table is the result of Matrix Pencil analysis method 
specifically. The results from MP were checked for 
consistency with results from other engines such as 
HTLS and ERA. 
The simulation data examined for the results in 
Table 3 were obtained using a window from t = 22 sec 
to t = 29 sec, however data in entries with an asterisk 
(*) were obtained with a ‘two-window’ method. The 
damping ratios given in the table which appear 
negative, but near zero, bear out to be a consequence of 
the analysis of the specific window selected and are not 
truly negatively damped. This is verified by two-
window analysis as well as extended simulation of an 
additional 60 seconds beyond line restoration. 
The entry denoted with {1} is for the substantial 
increase in interarea mode frequency over that of other 
controllers. Acceptance of the values for frequency and 
damping for this entry is supported by similar increases 
within the testing of [6] and verification of the 
soundness of the simulation case. The data for the 
entry denoted with {2} was obtained from a window of 
t = 25 to t = 35 seconds which reveals three modes, 
two of which appear to be caused by the spoofed signal 
error. One is identified with a frequency 0.652 Hz and 
4.802% damping which is the interarea mode, while 
the other two have frequencies of 0.332 Hz (with RE < 
5%, not listed in table) and 0.666 Hz, both with 
effectively 0% damping, which are the forced 
oscillations caused by spoofing. It appears that the 
second harmonic of the spoofed signal error contains 
the highest RE. 
 
Table 3. Modal analysis results for system test cases 
 
The entry {3} identifies a harmonic of the forced 
oscillation (spoofed signal) within the window from t = 
Proportional 0.635 0.532 100
30° Lead 0.647 1.540 100
60° Lead 0.664 4.778 100
90° Lead 0.687 13.635 100
120° Lead {1} 0.745 19.114 100
0.634 0.619 92.71
0.250 -0.006 5.99
30° Lead 0.647 1.155 98.78
60° Lead 0.665 2.649 97.62
0.672 8.796 91.46
0.738 -0.063 8.54
0.791 13.764 100 (t=22-25)
0.750 -0.086 57.69 (t=30-38)
0.666 1.293 87.68
0.334 0.804 9.34
30° Lead 0.652 0.413 100
0.666 0.137 83.54
0.652 4.805 14.88
0.662 12.589 91.27
0.671 0.384 8.73
0.865 19.469 59.56 (t=22-25)
0.666 -0.054 64.71 (t=30-38)
0.635 0.526 84.98
0.5 0.011 15.02
0.647 1.41 94.84
0.502 -0.723 5.160
0.657 4.326 89.52
0.500 -0.024 10.48
0.679 12.413 85.72
0.508 0.721 14.29
0.573 10.459 100 (t=22-25)
0.500 0.061 100 (t=30-38)
0.644 0.565 74.73
0.493 -0.448 17.91
0.247 -0.042 6.09
0.647 15.993 97.33 (t=21-25)
0.501 -0.224 67.61 (t=30-38)
0.754 0.155 26.36 (t=30-38)
0.247 -0.887 6.04 (t=30-38)
30° Lead
60° Lead
90° Lead
120° Lead * 
Proportional
90° Lead {4} * 
Damping (%) Relative Energy (%)
Proportional
90° Lead
120° Lead * 
Proportional
0.33 Hz 
Error
0.50 Hz 
Error
Combined 
Error
PMU 
status Controller Freq. (Hz)
60° Lead {2}
90° Lead {3}
120° Lead * 
Proportional
No error
0.25 Hz 
Error
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22 to t = 29 seconds. A further window from t = 30 to t 
= 38 seconds identifies the forced oscillation of 0.333 
Hz and its harmonic of 0.667 Hz, both with 0% 
damping, however the interarea mode fails to be 
identified distinctly from the harmonic. Finally, the 
entry {4} finds both forced oscillations of 0.247 Hz 
and 0.50 Hz, as well as the third harmonic of the 0.25 
Hz signal, within a window from t = 30 to t = 38 
seconds, all with 0% damping. The original simulation 
data and reconstructed signals are compared by FFT to 
assess the accuracy of the signal reconstructions and 
the modal analysis results. Figure 7 contains the plots 
of the FFTs for cases {2}, {3}, and {4}. 
 
 
Figure 7. FFTs of original and reconstructed voltage 
angle at bus 7 for 0.33 Hz case with 60° lead comp. {2}, 90° 
lead comp. {3}, and combined case with 90° lead comp. {4}. 
 
In the 0.25 Hz error cases, we see that the strongest 
component in the system response is a sustained 
oscillation of 0.75 Hz and 0.738 Hz for the 120° and 
90° controllers, which corresponds to the third 
harmonic of the 0.25 Hz spoofed input. An interaction 
between the 0.75 Hz harmonic and the 0.67 Hz 
interarea mode causes a resonance effect that is seen in 
the system responses and is the cause of the 0.75 Hz 
oscillation having a higher amplitude (represented in 
RE in the modal analysis) than the 0.25 Hz forced 
oscillation [13]. Similarly, for the 0.33 Hz spoofed 
signal case, the second harmonic at 0.66 Hz excites the 
system mode and dominates the closed loop system 
responses in Table 3. As is the case for the second 
harmonic of the 0.25 Hz spoofed input, the 0.50 Hz 
spoofed case does not present a strong resonance 
effect, owing to it not being close to the 0.67 Hz 
system mode [13]. 
 
4.3. Sensitivity to time error magnitude 
 
The initial assumption of a successful attack 
affecting the system with an oscillatory error of ±5° 
serves well as a basis for a severe case. However, the 
sensitivity of the system to subtler attacks should also 
be considered. A more detailed examination of system 
sensitivity could be conducted in future work, but 
within the scope of this paper a demonstration of the 
effects of increasing error amplitude were explored for 
a single case for illustrative purposes. The values 
presented in Table 4 are for a 30° lead compensator 
controller under the impact of a 0.33Hz spoofed 
oscillation. The real power fluctuations examined were 
from tie line 7-8 once the system reached a stable limit 
cycle (from 140 to 200 seconds). 
 
Table 4. Real power fluctuation values for various 
spoofed error amplitudes 
 
Error Amplitude (°±) Max Power (MW) Min Power (MW) Diff. (MW)
0.10 100.935 100.124 0.811
0.25 101.537 99.507 2.03
0.50 102.526 98.485 4.041
1.00 104.505 96.444 8.061
2.00 108.457 92.345 16.112
4.00 116.473 83.954 32.519  
 
      As can be seen from the table, for the range of error 
amplitudes examined (near the amplitude of interest for 
this paper) there is mostly a linear relationship between 
the error amplitude and the amplitude of real power 
fluctuations in steady state. The increases in power 
fluctuation appear to increase in a roughly linear 
fashion with increases in the spoofed signal error 
amplitude which emphasizes the small-signal dynamic 
nature of the phenomenon.   
     Unlike drift attacks [5] where the time-error and the 
corresponding angle error gradually increase over time, 
the time-error varies within small ranges (back and 
forth) for the cyclic time-error of this paper as 
indicated in Figure 1. Therefore, time-error induced 
forced oscillations studied in this paper can possibly go 
undetected for long periods of time especially at small 
amplitudes causing potential damage to expensive 
power system equipment and possibly leading to 
unintentional tripping of system components. 
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5. Conclusions  
 
In this paper the behavior of a power system in 
response to spoofed HVDC control signal during a 
transient event was investigated. Based upon several 
possible HVDC modulation control implementations, 
three spoofed GPS signal frequencies were simulated. 
The transient event simulation data revealed that the 
introduction of spoofed cyclic signals to HVDC control 
results in forced inter-area oscillations of varying 
amplitudes which were sensitive to inter-area mode 
damping ratio and the frequency of the spoofed signal. 
Some combinations of controller and spoofed signal 
frequency resulted in real power dynamic ranges in 
excess of ±35% of the scheduled line flow, as in the 
case of the 120° phase lead compensation controller 
and 0.50 Hz signal spoofing at bus 7. Combined cases 
were also examined in which control signals from both 
ends of the HVDC link were subject to spoofing. 
The sustained oscillations caused by the cyclic 
time-error spoofing will persist as long as the spoofed 
signal is imposed. A possible consequence of such 
oscillations may be that an undesirable control action is 
taken by an operator to mitigate the oscillations which 
may lead to service disruptions. Alternatively, if such 
oscillations do not warrant direct intervention, their 
presence in the system over time may still adversely 
affect power quality or cause damage to equipment 
such as generator rotor shafts. 
Various modal analyses were conducted on the data 
sets collected which revealed resonance phenomena 
due to the interaction of the spoofed signal with the 
inter-area mode frequency, as well as effects related to 
harmonics of the spoofed signal throughout the system. 
The resonance effect can be induced by any 
sufficiently high relative energy harmonic of the 
spoofed signal frequency, and not the fundamental 
frequency itself. This implies that for a given spoofed 
input signal there can be multiple inter-area modes 
which may be affected simultaneously by different 
harmonics of the spoofed input. A reduction in HVAC 
line flows or generator tripping are potential 
consequence of such sustained oscillations.  
While the simulations conducted in this paper 
revealed that these undamped spoofed signals and 
harmonics resulted in stable limit cycles, further 
investigation is needed to determine more precisely 
how these effects impact other system components or 
if they result in unacceptable operational conditions 
beyond the transient and small signal stability 
properties examined here. 
Several primary takeaways from the transient and 
small signal analyses are listed as follows: 
• The spoofed cyclic timing error signals with 
any controller tested cause sustained, undamped 
oscillations in the system.  
• The sustained oscillations may result in 
operator actions which disrupt service, or they may 
cause damage to synchronous generator equipment if 
they persist.  
• A harmonic of the spoofed input signal can 
have resonant interactions with an inter-area mode, and 
consequently different harmonics may cause resonance 
with multiple interarea modes in large real systems. 
While the system studied in this paper is quite 
simple, a similar study on a more complex system 
could yield useful insights for system operators. This 
further work could also include examination of 
possible ways to detect and mitigate the effects of such 
attacks upon the power system. 
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